Canada Strong Fund should be a resource sovereignty strategy, not a financing tool 

Canada should treat the proposed Canada Strong Fund as a nation-building instrument for resource sovereignty, not merely as another public financing vehicle. That distinction matters most in mining. Canada has long had the mineral endowment, legal institutions, engineering expertise and access to capital needed to lead in critical minerals and resource development. It has been less successful at converting those advantages into durable domestic wealth. Too much value still leaves the country through under-processing, fragmented infrastructure planning, delayed approvals and financing models that do not consistently preserve Canadian control over strategic assets. The Canada Strong Fund can help correct those weaknesses, but only if it is built to do more than co-invest passively with private capital. It should strengthen Canadian ownership, accelerate enabling infrastructure, support downstream value creation and embed Indigenous partnership as part of sound project governance. 

Recent federal announcements reinforce this point. Ottawa now describes the Canada Strong Fund as Canada’s first sovereign wealth fund, capitalized with $25 billion over three years and mandated to invest in projects of national strategic importance. Although the terminology has shifted, the underlying concept remains consistent with the argument advanced here: this is not a conventional sovereign wealth fund designed to preserve fiscal surpluses through diversified global investment. It is a sovereign capital instrument intended to catalyze domestic industrial development while pursuing commercial returns. That framing strengthens the case for treating the fund as a tool of resource sovereignty rather than a generic investment pool. The federal government has also signalled that the fund will operate alongside existing instruments, such as the Canada Growth Fund and the Strategic Innovation Fund, but with a more explicit focus on long-term national capability rather than project-specific incentives. That distinction matters because it positions the Canada Strong Fund as a structural institution rather than a transactional program. 

Mining makes the case plainly. Critical minerals sit at the centre of industrial strategy across allied economies because they support battery manufacturing, electricity systems, advanced manufacturing, defence applications and digital infrastructure. Canada has significant deposits of several minerals that are increasingly important to these supply chains. However, mineral abundance alone does not create sovereign advantage. A country that exports raw or minimally processed resources while other jurisdictions capture more of the refining, manufacturing and technology value chain is not fully securing the long-term benefit of its own endowment. Resource sovereignty requires more than extraction. It requires the legal, financial and physical capacity to retain a greater share of value at home. 

The Canada Strong Fund could serve that objective if its mandate is framed with discipline. Public money is most defensible where markets underprovide essential conditions for commercially sound development. That problem appears repeatedly in Canadian mining. Projects can remain stalled because roads, rail links, port access, transmission lines or regional processing facilities are missing. Private proponents often cannot finance those enabling assets efficiently on their own, especially where the benefits extend beyond a single project. A strategic public fund can be justified in that setting because it addresses structural coordination failures rather than simply rescuing weak ventures. It is meant to reduce barriers that prevent private capital from entering viable projects on reasonable terms. Recent federal-provincial discussions on northern infrastructure corridors, including the Ring of Fire and Nunavut’s Grays Bay Road and Port Project, illustrate how multi-project infrastructure gaps continue to impede otherwise viable mineral development. 

This logic has become more urgent as federal policy has evolved. Ottawa’s 2026 Critical Minerals Strategy introduced a $2 billion Critical Minerals Sovereign Fund and more than $400 million for processing and refining technologies. The Defence Industrial Strategy, released earlier this year, explicitly identifies certain mines, concentrators and refineries as security infrastructure. These developments confirm that critical minerals are no longer treated as ordinary commodities. They are strategic assets whose domestic development and downstream capture matter for national resilience. The Canada Strong Fund must be designed accordingly. The federal government has also begun coordinating with allies through the Minerals Security Partnership, which aims to reduce reliance on non-aligned suppliers and strengthen shared supply chain resilience. Canada’s ability to contribute meaningfully to that alliance depends on its capacity to advance projects beyond the exploration stage and into processing, refining and component manufacturing. 

That approach also aligns with Canadian public law. Resource development in Canada is governed not only by economics and regulation but also by constitutional principle. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, recognizes and affirms existing Aboriginal and treaty rights. The Supreme Court of Canada has made clear that the Crown may owe a duty to consult and, where appropriate, accommodate Indigenous peoples when contemplated Crown conduct may adversely affect asserted or established rights. Haida Nation versus British Columbia (Minister of Forests) remains central to that doctrine. Tsilhqot’in Nation versus British Columbia also confirms the significance of Aboriginal title in land and resource decisions. These principles are part of the legal architecture within which major projects must be structured. 

That constitutional setting strengthens the case for building the Canada Strong Fund around partnership rather than simple project finance. Projects that lack meaningful Indigenous participation often face greater legal uncertainty, weaker social legitimacy and more difficulty securing durable approval conditions. Projects built with genuine Indigenous partnership can reduce those risks while improving long-term governance. This is increasingly a matter of legal prudence and commercial stability. A fund that aims to improve the conditions for major Canadian resource development should recognize that Indigenous participation is often part of what makes a project bankable, lawful and resilient over time. The growing number of Indigenous-owned or co-owned energy and infrastructure assets, including transmission lines in Alberta and hydro facilities in Manitoba, demonstrates that equity participation is no longer exceptional; it is becoming a mainstream governance model. 

Federal policy has already begun moving in that direction. The Indigenous Loan Guarantee Program, now expanded through the Canada Indigenous Loan Guarantee Corporation, was launched to support Indigenous ownership in Canada’s natural resource and energy projects by lowering financing barriers through loan guarantees of up to $5 billion. That initiative reflects a broader shift toward Indigenous equity participation rather than limiting Indigenous communities to the role of consultees. This matters for mining and infrastructure because equity ownership can better align long-term interests among Indigenous nations, project proponents, governments and lenders. The Canada Strong Fund should make partnership and, where appropriate, Indigenous co-ownership part of its working logic. 

The same need for precision applies to the legal language surrounding the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act. The act affirms the declaration as an international human rights instrument that can help interpret and apply Canadian law and establishes a federal framework for implementation in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples. Yet accuracy matters here. The act does not itself immediately alter Canada’s existing duty to consult. Public commentary sometimes blurs that distinction and creates confusion about the current legal standard. A careful legal analysis should avoid overstating the act’s immediate doctrinal effect while still recognizing that it shapes the policy environment in which federal resource decisions are made. 

Once those legal and institutional realities are kept in view, the core argument for the Canada Strong Fund becomes clearer. The fund should be judged by whether it improves Canada’s capacity to move from raw resource extraction toward integrated industrial development. That means supporting the kinds of assets and relationships that allow mining projects to proceed on stronger domestic terms. Shared infrastructure is part of that picture. Processing and refining capacity are part of it as well. Canada has spent too long tolerating a pattern in which strategic minerals leave the country before more of their value is captured through downstream activity. In a world defined by supply chain competition and industrial policy, that pattern is a strategic weakness. 

The fund should therefore focus on four linked priorities. It should help finance enabling infrastructure that unlocks more than one project or region. It should support commercially disciplined investment that attracts private capital rather than replacing it. It should strengthen Canadian participation in downstream value-added segments of the resource economy. It should also treat Indigenous partnership as an ordinary feature of sound investment design in major projects. 

Governance will determine whether the fund succeeds. Public investment in politically significant sectors always creates a risk of blurred lines between commercial analysis and electoral symbolism. Arm’s-length status is helpful, but it is not enough on its own. A credible institution will need clear statutory objectives, transparent investment criteria, independent governance and regular public reporting on both financial performance and mandate compliance. Without those safeguards, the fund could become vulnerable to the criticism that it socializes risk while privatizing upside selectively. International experience reinforces this point: institutions such as Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global and Singapore’s Temasek demonstrate that sovereign capital vehicles succeed when governance is insulated from short-term political pressure and when investment mandates are explicit, measurable and consistently applied. 

Critics are right to warn against romanticizing the model. The fund is not a substitute for coherent regulation, disciplined project assessment or sound fiscal judgment. It should not become a vehicle for indiscriminate subsidies or politically expedient investment. Canada faces recurring structural obstacles in nationally significant sectors, especially where long timelines, high capital intensity, infrastructure deficits and fragmented decision-making suppress productive investment. A public fund can be justified if it is narrowly built to address those obstacles while preserving commercial discipline and legal legitimacy. 

That is why the most useful description of the Canada Strong Fund is not that it is simply an investment pool. It is a proposed institutional answer to a persistent Canadian problem. Canada has often had the resources, but not the machinery, to convert resource potential into domestic productive strength at the scale the moment requires. Mining, critical minerals and related infrastructure are now testing whether the country can do better. A fund that merely places public capital beside private money will not be enough. A fund that helps lock in infrastructure, downstream capacity, Indigenous partnership and stronger Canadian control over strategic development could make a real difference. 

Canadian Mining Journal’s readership is well placed to understand what is at stake. The issue is not whether responsible mining should proceed. The issue is whether Canada will finally build the institutions needed to ensure that responsible mining produces broader and more lasting national benefit. The Canada Strong Fund should be built for that purpose. If Ottawa treats resource sovereignty as the governing objective and commercial discipline as the condition of legitimacy, the fund could become one of the more important developments in Canadian resource policy in years. If it is treated as a branding exercise or a diffuse investment program, it will add little to a familiar cycle of ambition without structural change. 

Carlos da Costa, PhD, is an adjunct finance professor at the University of British Columbia and an experienced financial professional with expertise in valuations and modelling, derivatives, structured finance, commodities, risk management, structured products, and financial analytics.